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ABSTRACT 
The development of cooperative relations within and between firms plays an important role in the 
successful implementation of business strategy. How to produce such relations is less well understood. 
We build on work in relational contract theory and the evolution of cooperation to examine the conditions 
under which group based incentives outperform individual based incentives and how they produce more 
cooperative behavior. Group interactions are modeled as iterated games in which individuals learn 
optimal strategies under individual and group based reward mechanisms. The space of possible games is 
examined and it is found that, when individual and group interests are not aligned, group evaluation and 
reward systems lead to higher group performance and, counter-intuitively, higher individual performance. 
Such groups include individuals who, quite differently to free-riders, sacrifice their own performance for 
the good of the group. We discuss the implications of these results for the design of incentive systems. 
 
Keywords: emergence of cooperation, incentive systems, iterated games, group selection, agent-based 
model 
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1 Introduction 
The focus of much research and teaching in management concerns decision analysis rather than 
administration or implementation.  As Henry Mintzberg (2005) observes in his book Managers not MBAs 
“MBA students graduate with the impression that management is analysis, specifically the making of 
systematic decisions and the formulation of deliberate strategies”. But management is more; it is about 
getting things done, about implementing decisions within and across firm boundaries. It involves working 
with people who need to carry out interrelated activities, using specialized resources and skills in a 
particular context and who need to communicate, coordinate and cooperate to achieve goals.  
 
This paper considers how management can improve the behavior and performance of groups and teams. 
Empirical research has identified various characteristics of groups, relations and networks that are 
associated with improved performance, including the role of cooperative behavior (e.g. de Jong et al 
2005, Cummings and Cross 2003, Dyer 2006, Spekman and Davis 2004, Wilkinson 2008). These studies, 
however, do not tell us how such cooperation can be developed and managed, only the personal and 
behavioral characteristics that are associated with its presence. More generally, the reasons for 
cooperative and altruistic behavior, the presence of which has been repeatedly demonstrated in 
experiments carried out across many cultures (e.g. Henrich et al 2004), is not well understood. Recent 
developments in biological theories of the evolution of cooperation point to the importance of group 
based selection and reward mechanisms in driving the emergence of cooperative behavior and superior 
performance. This paper investigates whether these theories may be applied to the design of business 
incentive systems that improve cooperation and performance.  
 
To examine the role of group based incentive systems we develop an agent based simulation model of the 
interactions of individuals within groups. Individuals engage in pair wise iterated games with other group 
members. A genetic algorithm is used to capture the impact of individual and group based selection and 
reward systems on behavior. In an exhaustive set of simulations we examine the conditions under which 
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group reward systems are superior to individual based systems in producing better performing, and more 
cooperative, groups and individuals. Group based systems are demonstrated to be superior, for many, but 
not all types of games. We argue these results have important implications for the design of intra and 
inter-firm incentive systems and help explain the results of previous experiments and case studies.  
 
By performing computation experiments we are able to consider a complex setting and a large range of 
games that would be beyond mathematical tractability (Leombruni and Matteo 2005). Whilst laboratory 
experiments structured in the same manner as those we carry out, could, in theory, be used to investigate 
individual specifications. To examine the vast number of empirical experiments represented by the 
simulations would be practically impossible.  Simulation enables us to represent key features of group 
interaction and incentive systems and to track outcomes over time, under a wide variety of controlled 
conditions. The simulation results therefore provide a basis for designing future empirical research.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the role of cooperation in business and review 
research concerning the evolution of cooperation. We then develop an agent based model of group 
interaction and evolution and use it to examine the effect of different reward and selection mechanisms.  
Detailed results are first presented for three illustrative games and then for simulations spanning an 
exhaustive space of games. Finally, the relevance and implications of our results for the design of intra 
and inter-firm incentive systems is discussed together with future research opportunities. 
 
2 Cooperation in Business 
Cooperative relations are increasingly seen as a source of competitive advantage for firms, industries, 
regions and nations (e.g. Dyer 2006, Spekman and Davis 2004).  Within a firm there are many formal and 
informal groups of people and departments carrying out interdependent activities that co-produce value 
(Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). As one manager comments: “We think everything worth doing is done by 
groups, not by individuals” (Weber et al. 2005, p. 80). The degree of cooperation and coordination within 
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and among groups effects firm performance (Luo et al 2006, Hakansson and Snehota 1995; Rulke and 
Galaskiewicz 2000; Smith et al, 1995). Similarly the value of cooperation between firms has also been 
highlighted (Wilkinson 2008; Xu and Beamon 2006; Mattsson 1997; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  
 
Prior research has analyzed the role of cooperation in business and identified various characteristics of 
individuals, groups, relations and networks associated with superior performance.  The means by which 
groups, relations and networks with these characteristics are produced and maintained is not well 
understood. Producing such groups is not straight forward because managers and firms cannot directly 
control or monitor the behavior of all actors involved.  Within firms, managers control formal hierarchies 
and systems, however, informal influence structures also emerge and self-organize. These informal 
structures evolve as a result of the outcomes and experiences of the various interactions which take place 
over time. Overall performance is not a linear sum of individual performances, it is co-produced and 
difficult to trace to, and control through the actions of individuals. Similarly, the performance of firms 
depends on the actions of others both directly and indirectly and on the types of relations that develop 
among the firms involved (Amaral and Uzzi 2007, Koza, and Lewin 1998, Wilkinson and Young 2002).  
 
The problem of forming effective groups can be understood in terms of the theory of relational 
contracting in transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE focuses on matching governance structures to the 
types of transactions and interactions taking place (Williamson 1979, 1981, 1996). However, designing 
efficient governance structures is only part of the problem because it cannot be assumed that contractual 
provisions will actually be carried out due to post-contractual uncertainties and conflicts of interest, 
leading to potential problems of opportunism and shirking. As Oliver Williamson (1996, p 605) observes, 
“maladaptation in the contract execution interval is the principal source of inefficiency.”  
 
Implementation takes place over time through the interactions of the actors involved. This can be modeled 
as an iterated game in which the parties involved learn to communicate, coordinate and cooperate with 
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each other in efficient manners.  Experiments have shown that repeated interactions in a joint task result 
in the development of a task-specific form of communication that guides actions and responses in 
efficient ways (Weber and Camerer 2003, Selten and Warglien 2007). Further, relational contracting 
models show how actors can learn from their failures and develop efficient routines for coordinating 
actions (e.g. Chassang 2010, Blume and Franco 2007).  An important factor underlying these results is the 
alignment of the interests of the parties involved, which reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior and 
shirking and promotes the development of more open communication, coordination and cooperation.   
 
The degree to which alignment of interests develops depends on the nature of the coordination game and 
the incentives for each party. If each individual’s outcomes are maximized when they behave in ways that 
maximize the group’s total outcomes, there is an alignment of interests and it is only a question of 
learning what the right combination of actions is. If some parties gain more by acting in ways that damage 
group outcomes there is a misalignment of interests. A good example is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in 
which the greatest total gain comes from mutual cooperation whilst the greatest individual gain comes 
from defection against a cooperator. As a result there are mixed incentives to cooperate and defect.  In a 
one shot game both parties defect to minimize their worst payoff and so lose the gains that would come 
from mutual cooperation.  In repeated games cooperative strategies can prevail because cooperative 
behavior can be demonstrated and defection punished over time (e.g. Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).  
 
One way of aligning the interests of the parties is through implementing group based, as opposed to 
individual based incentives. Individual based incentive systems assess and reward individuals for their 
performance, whereas group based incentives assess and reward the group as a whole and divide the 
outcomes among group members in ways that are not directly related to their personal performance (see 
for example Weber and Camerer, 2003, and Selten and Warglien, 2007). Despite their demonstrated 
effectiveness, group based assessment and reward systems are not common in industry.  In most firms 
individual based systems are the norm (Pfeffer 1998).  The role of formal and informal group and team 
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effects are largely ignored and unrewarded, despite the fact that much performance may be attributable to 
group interactions. As Henry Mintzberg observed: 
 
 “We know that the most effective companies and organizations are those that embody the 
importance of being communities. ...  But most conventional management practice and education 
has gone in completely the opposite direction. It’s becoming more mercenary, more 
individualistic, less community oriented, and less nuanced.” (cited in Kleiner 2010, p.2) 
 
When group reward systems are used within firms to encourage more coordination and cooperation 
between people and departments, they are often criticized as they may potentially reward shirkers and free 
riders, as well as those who are actually driving the performance outcomes. As noted, however, group 
outcomes depend on interactions taking place over time in non obvious ways. Individuals who are 
apparent shirkers or free riders could potentially be playing essential roles in the group’s overall 
functioning and performance. By not rewarding them or removing them from the group, group 
performance could be damaged.  Building groups comprising only those who have individually 
performed well may produce dysfunctional, less cooperative, lower performing groups because the people 
making them up may not be prepared to contribute in ways that enhance total value.   
 
A similar argument may be made about the manner in which firm performance is assessed and rewarded 
primarily in terms of individual firms’ success rather than the performance of networks of interrelated 
firms in industries and value chains. This focus on the individual firm is reflected in theories that try to 
explain it only in terms of the behavior, resources, capabilities and orientations of individual firms and 
their managers and which exclude from explanations firms’ relation and network contexts. Examples of 
such theories include: the resource based view (Barney 1991), resource-advantage theory (Hunt 1995), 
and the importance placed on various types of firm orientations, including market (Narver and Slater 
1990), production (Nobel et al. 2002), technology and strategic (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997). Trade and 
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industry policies also tend to focus on rewarding and boosting the performance of individual firms rather 
than interrelated networks and industries (e.g. Porter 1990, Wilkinson et al 2000). 
 
The focus on individual-based incentive systems stems in part from a belief in the primary role of 
competition, in which only the fittest survive, in driving performance. This is an individualistic and 
adversarial approach in which business is seen as a form of war. But, as we have argued, individual and 
firm performance is to a large extent co-produced through people and firms interacting and working 
together, rather than by the independent actions of individuals and firms. Ensuring that people and firms 
work together effectively requires some alignment of interests which we will demonstrate can, in part, be 
achieved through group based assessment and reward systems.  
 
2.1 The Evolution of Cooperation 
While the emergence and value of cooperation among people is observed throughout the social realm, the 
reasons for this is unclear and remains a frequent topic of articles in leading scientific journals (e.g. Haidt 
2007; Hruschka and Henrich 2006; Nowak 2006). There are three main explanations. Firstly, it is 
explained in terms of those involved having unique features that enable cooperators to recognize each 
other. This, however, is a not a stable solution, as it creates opportunities for non-cooperators to emerge 
who mimic, and so exploit, cooperators (Henrich 2004). The second type of theory is kinship based and 
explains cooperation in terms of the biological relation between two actors. People are more caring, self-
sacrificing and cooperative towards others they are related to, such as their children, parents and siblings.  
The more closely related they are, i.e. the more genes they have in common, the more cooperative and 
self sacrificing they are (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Henrich 2004).  Kinship based explanations, 
however, are not relevant for understanding cooperation in business, except in the relatively rare case of 
related individuals working in the same or different firms. 
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Third, the emergence of cooperation is explained as a consequence of the interactions taking place over 
time between individuals. Repeated interactions are, as already noted, different from one-off interactions. 
Cooperative strategies can emerge because of the shadow of the past (demonstration of past altruism) and 
the future (value of cooperation in subsequent interaction) (Axelrod 1984). This was demonstrated in 
computational simulations by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Lindgren 1997 and Hanaki et al. (2007). 
Computational work has also shown that cooperative strategies can evolve and develop in evolutionary 
settings that challenge the presumption that natural selection leads to the evolution of genes for selfish 
behavior (Bergstrom 2002). 
 
2.2 Group Selection 
A fourth way in which the emergence of cooperation may be explained has recently regained favor.  
Group selection, or more precisely multi-level group selection, focuses on the group as the unit of 
assessment, rather than the individual actor. This theory hypothesizes that groups, with some degree of 
continuity of membership and somewhat cooperative interaction, provide advantage to their members and 
outperform groups where survival is based on individual performance (Goodnight and Stevens 1997).   
 
An illustration of the power of group selection mechanisms is provided by an experiment seeking the 
optimal method of egg production. Selective breeding of hens which lay the most eggs has been used for 
many years, resulting in birds that are aggressive with high mortality rates which undermine increased 
egg production. The seriousness of the problem is reflected in a popular Harvard Business Case, Optical 
Distortion Inc. (Clarke and Wise 2009).  Research by Muir (1996) has showed that selecting the most 
productive groups of hens, rather than individuals, results in superior egg laying performance and normal 
life spans. He has since shown similar results in other types of animals and plants (Muir, 2005).   
 
Group selection is not a new theory.  It was initially embraced by evolutionary biologists (e.g. Wynne-
Edwards 1962) then rejected (e.g. Maynard-Smith 1976, Williams 1966) due to the suspect 
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methodological approaches of its adherents and because its explanations were less parsimonious than 
those of individual selection, A re-examination of the evolutionary equations underlying group selection, 
first proposed in the 1960s (Griffing 1967, Price 1970), led to a reappraisal of the theory and research.  It 
was shown that experimental results demonstrating the superiority of individual selection did so due to 
the exclusion of interaction effects (Goodnight and Stevens 1997), in other words a random mixing of the 
population was assumed. Group selection theories, however, rely on this not being the case. Henrich 
(2004) has further developed the theory of group selection in terms of social and economic systems. 
Using a model based on the Price equations (1970), he explains the development of cooperative strategies 
in social systems in terms of within-group and between-group selection processes and establishes 
conditions for the persistence of altruism within a population even when egotism has strictly greater 
absolute fitness. He highlights a fundamental tension. Research in biological and social communities 
shows that, within groups, competitive behavior provides greater benefits to individuals than cooperative 
behavior but more cooperative groups outperform more competitive groups.  
 
This line of work has important implications for the design of incentive systems to produce more 
cooperative intra and inter-firm relations.  It suggests a mechanism by which more cooperative behavior 
and better group performance can be engineered through group as opposed to individual based incentive 
systems. The fundamental question is: Under what conditions do group based assessment, reward and 
selection systems do better than individual based systems in terms of the emergence of cooperative 
behavior and performance?  The answer to this question has not yet been provided. Existing research has 
focused on the effects of individual selection mechanisms (e.g. Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). The effect 
of group selection has been largely overlooked with a few exceptions.  Axelrod (1987) considered it in 
terms of spatial models whilst Bowles et al. (2003) show how the existence of certain types of group level 
structures may encourage the evolution of group beneficial traits. Work has also primarily focused on the 
IPD game rather than other types of games, which have different types of payoffs. No research has 
systematically compared the impact of group versus individual selection for different game conditions.  
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3 Modeling Group Interactions in terms of Iterated Games 
In this section we present a simple model of the interaction of individuals under different social situations 
(games). We examine the effect of two different reward mechanism, group selection, in which the best 
performing groups are rewarded, and individual selection in which the best performing individuals are 
rewarded. We use an evolutionary learning algorithm to find the equilibrium strategies under each 
mechanism. Note, we do not argue that in reality individuals go through an evolutionary process, instead 
this is simply a mechanism to determine equilibrium behavior in different circumstances. As such this 
model is normative, rather than descriptive of the mechanism by which group selection occurs. By using 
this simple approach we are able to remove many incidental factors to show the circumstances under 
which each reward mechanism induces superior performance in both individuals and the team as a whole.  
 
3.1 Model 
We consider a model in which pairs of individuals within groups interact. The interactions take the form 
of two player, binary choice games. For ease of description we refer to the two actions as “cooperate” and 
“defect”. They could, however, take any name, the important factor is the payoff for each pair of actions 
given in the payoff matrix and how this reflects the alignment (or not) of individual and combined 
outcomes.  
 
The population consists of n players divided into m groups, each of equal size (n/m). In each generation 
every individual plays a specific 2 player game with every other individual within the group in turn. Each 
interaction last for r rounds. Here we implicitly model all members of the group as interacting equally 
frequently with all other members, however, this need not be the case. A network structure could be 
imposed on each group which would determine the individual interactions. It is known that the structure 
of relations within a group (e.g. Cummings and Cross, 2003) or units within an organization (e.g. Ethiraj 
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and Levinthal, 2004) can influence its performance. Here we the simplest group structure in order to 
separate and demonstrate the effect of the reward and evaluation mechanism.  
 
Each individual has a strategy dictating how they play the game. Strategies are represented as a string of 
zeros (defect) and ones (cooperate), which specify the players’ response to all possible game situations. 
The set of situations a player may face is dependent on their memory length. With two possible actions, 
and a memory length of k, there are 2k possible game situations the player must be able to respond to. In 
other words in each of k pervious time steps a players opponent will have played one of two different 
actions giving 2k possible histories. For example, a strategy with memory length two must be able to 
respond to 4 different game histories of opponent actions i.e. DD, DC, CD and CC. Throughout this paper 
we use the contention that the most historically distant action is on the left with actions increasing in 
recentness to the right, for example DC means the opponent defected two periods ago, and cooperated in 
the last period.  
 
This strategy, however, is not complete. Players actions depend on the history of their opponent’s actions. 
At the start of the game, for the first k periods, the player does not have sufficient observations of their 
opponent’s actions to be able to choose an action themselves. To resolve this a player’s strategy also 
contains a fictitious history, k actions, which govern responses during the first k periods. For example 
with a memory of two, in addition to the 4 bits governing the players responses there are two additional 
bits giving the fictitious history (by convention we start the bit string with these values). A strategy of 
010111 is composed of a fictitious history of 01 (first two positions) and 0111 (positions 3-6) 
corresponding to actions in the four states (described above). This means the individual defects if the 
other player defected in the previous two rounds (0 in position 3), cooperates after defection two periods 
ago and cooperation in the last period (1 in position 4), cooperates if their opponent cooperated two 
rounds ago but defected in the last (1 in position 5) and cooperates if the other player cooperated in both 
of the last two rounds (1 in position 6).  A player’s first move will be solely governed by their pre-
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assigned memory, in this case the memory is 01 which corresponds to D two periods ago and C one 
period ago. The agent therefore plays C, in the first period, the response to DC (fourth position) in their 
strategy. In the second period the second (more recent) value in the fictitious history (here the value 1) 
along with one round of real history are used.  Let us assume the other player defects on the first round, 
the history will then be 10 (or CD) so the player will therefore play cooperate in the next round. After 
round two, decisions are solely based on the real history of play.  
 
By representing the strategy as a single bit string we are able to use a simple Genetic Algorithm (Holland 
,1975) to optimize behavior (in a similar manner to Axelrod, 1987, Midgley et al, 1997)1. At the start of 
the simulation individual strategies are randomly generated. In each generation each individual’s score is 
calculated as the total value of the players payoffs from all games played against all other members of the 
individual’s group. The group’s score is the total score of all players within a group. Once every player 
has played every other player within their group a new generation of players is generated from the 
existing population. One of two alternative selection mechanisms is used to produce the groups. Under 
individual selection the best performing individuals are denoted as the n/2 individuals with the highest 
total scores in the population. These individuals are copied directly into the next generation. The 
remaining individuals are formed by randomly choosing pairs of the best performing individuals and 
creating a new strategy by combining the first part of one strategy with the second part of the other 
(crossover). In biology this mimics reproduction, whilst in social systems it may be thought of as a form 
of learning and sharing of strategies within a population. The break point for the parts is chosen rnaomdly 
from a uniform distribution. After crossover there is also a small probability (5%) of a single point 
mutation in a strategy in which a 0 flips to 1 or vice versa. The set of n new individuals are then randomly 
allocated to groups. Under group selection the m/2 best performing groups are selected and copied 
                                                
1 Miller (1996) uses an alternative automate mechanism, This approach allows more complex strategies at 
the expense of clarity of interpretation. 
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directly into the next generation. The remaining groups are formed by combining pairs of individuals 
selected from the best performing groups at random, irrespective of their individual performance.   
 
The genetic algorithm, by following this mechanism, selects the better individual strategies and allows 
them to spread throughout the population. Mating and mutation provide the mechanism by which 
successful strategies may be copied and new strategies developed. Over time this mechanism results in a 
population of strategies which are optimized to each other and the selection mechanism. The process of 
playing games and generating new populations is repeated 1000 times. Convergence occurs relatively 
early in this period (Figure 1) but continuing demonstrates the steady state. Games are played for r=200 
rounds2. The population size, n=64, whist the number of groups, m=8. The memory length, k=3. 
Repeating the simulations with different numbers and sizes of groups, different population sizes and 
memory lengths did not qualitatively change the results but are available from the authors on request. All 
results are averaged over 100 repetitions with different random seeds. 
Table 1 about here 
We first describe the results for three specific iterated games prominent in the literature (payoff matrices 
are shown in Table 1).  These were chosen to reflect three types of misalignment of interests between 
individual and combined outcomes, as well as being games that have frequently been used to model social 
and business interactions. In the second part of the paper we will consider a large space of games, the 
interactions and behaviors observed in the sample games will aid in understanding this larger space. The 
sample games are the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) and two versions of the Chicken game (in some 
literatures this game is referred to as Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift). The prisoners dilema is a mixed motive 
game in which the Nash equilibrium for a one shot game is Defect-Defect (DD). Mutual cooperation 
results in the best combined outcome but the temptation to defect, to receive a higher individual payoff 
and avoid the lowest payoff, means it is not an equilibrium. The first Chicken game in Table 1, labeled 
                                                
2 Different numbers of rounds were examined but had no effect on the results. 
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Weak Chicken3, produces the greatest combined payoff with combinations of Cooperate-Cooperate (CC) 
(4+4), Cooperate-Defect (CD) (1+7) and Defect-Cooperate (DC) (7+1). Under the second chicken game, 
Strong Chicken, the combined payoff for playing CD or DC is greater than that for always cooperating 
(e.g. 10+1 versus 4+4) or both defecting. Individual and combined outcomes are misaligned because one 
player receives the worst score under the outcome producing the highest combined return. In both of these 
games there are multiple Nash equilibriums, both the CD and DC outcomes provide no incentive for 
either player to change strategy. In a one shot game, however, there is no way for the players to determine 
which individual will take which role and so any payoff may occur. In repeated interactions other 
strategies may arise. The strong chicken game is an anti-coordination game, i.e. where complementary 
rather than the same actions are required to maximize combined payoffs, even though they result in 
greater variance in payoffs among the players. The weak chicken game differs in that the same combined 
payoff may be achieved by both players cooperating, even if a higher individual payoff may be achieved 
if one defected. Under repeated interactions equilibrium selection becomes an important aspect. 
 
4 Results 
Figure 1 shows the average payoff players receive from a single game at different times in the simulation 
for the genetic algorithm operating with group selection (left) and individual selection (right). Each figure 
shows the score averaged over 100 repetitions of the best (highest scoring) individual in the population, 
the worst (lowest scoring) individual and the average of all players for each of the three games. 
 
We first consider the average payoffs of all individuals in the population. This measure captures the 
performance of the groups as a whole. As groups are the same size, a higher average payoff indicates a 
better group performance. For all games group selection produces better performance - higher average 
payoff – than individual selection.  
                                                
3 These games are similar to those labeled Weak and Strong alternation by Bednar et al (2010), however, the Weak 
Alteration and Weak Chicken differ importantly in their relative payoffs, we therefore do not adopt the same terms. 
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Figure 1 about here 
It is perhaps not surprising that group selecting produces the highest average scores as a high average 
score translates into a high total group score. This selection mechanism explicitly selects those groups 
with the highest total score and so is effectively maximizing this value. Unexpected, however, in all cases, 
group selection also produces the best performing individuals. This is surprising as group selection does 
not attempt to maximize this aspect. In contrast, individual selection chooses the highest scoring 
individuals in each generation of the population and so would be expected to produce the best performing 
individuals overall. This underscores the importance of the group context when considering fitness and 
performance. Whilst individual selection chooses the best performing individuals it ignores the context, 
the group, in which they achieved the score. Group selection, however, is able to maintain strong 
environments which allow individuals to perform better. For example, within the strong chicken game 
individuals playing CD or DC achieve the highest combined score. In order to achieve this score one 
individual gets a high payoff whilst the other gets a low payoff (Table 1). Under individual selection only 
those obtaining the high payoff would survive, those obtaining the low payoff would be eliminated and so 
in subsequent generations payoffs would decrease as those with the same strategy playing against each 
other achieve a low payoff. Group selection is better able to support groups composed of varied 
individuals as evidenced by the wide spread between the best and worst individual scores under Strong 
Chicken. As a consequence, the best performing individuals are found under this mechanism with their 
performance being at the cost of others group members. The low scoring individuals could easily be 
regarded as underperformers but this is not correct because their behavior enables others to achieve 
greater gains for the group as a whole. 
 
Whilst individual selection provides more impetus for high levels of individual performance it allows 
selfish, non-cooperative strategies to invade groups.  This can reduce the absolute performance of the 
group and its best performing individuals. For example, a population in which all members of all groups 
cooperate in the IPD. If a single defector is added to the population, the group to which the individual is 
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added will do worse than all other groups and be eliminated under group selection. In contrast, under 
individual selection, that defecting strategy will exhibit the best performance in the population and will be 
reproduced in the next generation.  Sophisticated strategies that discriminate between cooperators and 
defectors, playing the optimal response to each may limit the invasion of defectors, however, the random 
group formation means that a small percentage of defectors will achieve higher scores in their group and 
will persist under individual selection. A group that always cooperates will remain stable under group 
selection, achieving high fitness consistently.   
 
Mean performance generally varies more under individual selection than group selection. This is because, 
under group selection, the environment in which strategies interact remains comparatively stable, whole 
groups are copied completely from generation to generation, allowing successful strategies to propagate 
and fixate in the population more quickly. In contrast for individual selection, a strategy that does well in 
one generation is not guaranteed to be so in the next generation due to the changing mix of strategies in its 
group. Consequently, evolution is noisier, exhibiting more variation.  
 
4.1 Strategies 
The results presented above demonstrate the ability of group selection to out-perform individual selection 
for three iterated games. In both the individual and group selection cases a particular strategy, such as tit-
for-tat (TFT), does not come to dominate. Instead a variety of strategies continue to exist and evolve. The 
reason for this is that various combinations of strategies (the group’s genotype) can produce the same 
observable behavior over time (the group’s phenotype). For instance, in a group where there is 
consistently cooperative behavior, a strategy that would defect in response to a partner’s defection, 
behaves in the same way as a habitual cooperator, though it possesses different response rules (genes) in 
some situations. In these circumstances it is difficult to distinguish between individuals who are always 
cooperative from those that give the appearance of being so. With continuous cooperation a strategy’s 
responses to defection will be under no pressure to change. In successive generations they can continue to 
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include in their strategies instructions to defect in response to defection without this affecting behavior or 
performance.  In short, a bigger variety of genotypes (strategies) than phenotypes (behavior) can exist in a 
population because different mixes of strategies result in the same patterns of behavior.  But if conditions 
change in a group, due to mutation for example, different outcomes and performance effects will occur 
because different strategies respond to the changed conditions in different ways. Some strategies lead 
behavior back to mutual cooperation, whereas others do not, resulting in a decline in performance and 
possible elimination. 
 
In order to gain an appreciation of the range of strategies emerging and co-existing it is necessary to 
consider a large population rather than a single simulation result. The results are based on the set of 
strategies present in the 1000th generation of the simulations conducted above. Each cell gives the fraction 
of individuals who had a cooperate response in that location of their strategy. For clarity, the memory 
length three strategies are represented by strings of eleven zeros (D) or ones (C).  The first three digits are 
the three period fictitious history whilst the next eight digits indicate how the strategy responds to each 
possible three period history i.e. DDD, DDC, DCD, DCC, CDD, CDC, CCD, CCC. For example, the 
strategy 111011111111 begins by cooperating (final digit=1), which is the response to CCC (first three 
digits=1), its initial memory, and it is not until it experiences three defections in a row that it defects 
(indicated by the zero in the fourth position). In all other situations it cooperates. 
Table 2 about here 
The strategies produced in the group selection and individual selection cases differ noticeably. Group 
strategies: 
Think Nicer: Comparison of positions 1 to 3 shows that group selection strategies commence the game 
with a more positive attitude, being more likely to assume a history of.    
Act Nicer: In general, the strategies evolved through individual selection are more likely to defect in 
response to a given pattern of behavior than group selection strategies.  In particular, in group selection 
they are more likely to cooperate after three successive defections (55.5% versus 30.8%), which avoids 
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getting caught in cycles of defection. They are more likely to continue to cooperate when the pattern is 
repeatedly cooperative (DCC, CCC) and are more forgiving, being more prepared to cooperate when 
there is cooperation after two previous defections (58% versus 26.4%).  
More Provocable:  Group evolved strategies are not naïve cooperators, as they are just as likely as 
individual selection strategies to retaliate once the other starts to defect, i.e. responses to DCD and CDD.  
Group selected strategies have much in common with the characteristics of successful strategies identified 
by Axelrod’s (1984) in an IPD setting:  nice, provocable, forgiving and clear. 
 
4.2 Space of Games 
So far we have compared group and individual selection for three games. There are, however, a vast 
number of games beyond those we have considered, each with associated incentives to cooperative or 
defect. In this section we examine a broad spectrum of games to determine the types in which individual 
or group selection are superior.  
 
Rapoport and Guyer (1966) identify 726 strategically distinct 2x2 games in which individuals have weak 
preferences over outcomes4. For this analysis, however, the absolute values of the payoffs rather than 
simply their ordering is important in determining strategy success. This is because selection and so 
survival into the next generation depends on overall score across all interactions. Consequently there are 
an infinite number of possible games, making an exhaustive analysis impossible. In order to bound our 
analysis we restrict all payoffs to be integer multiples of 0.1 and to lie in the range [0,1]. This space 
consists of 14,641 games that show a great variety of different structures and include all of the standard 
orderings of payoffs. There are some types of games that cannot be represented in this format, for 
instance games that would produce lexicographic preferences (those in which the payoffs would be such 
that an individual would prefer to receive one particular payoff once rather than any of the others 200 
                                                
4 If preferences are strong there are 78 distinct games. 
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times), nevertheless, this set is substantial and we believe sufficient for the analysis both in terms of its 
breadth and detail.  
 
In the following discussion we will refer to the payoffs in terms of the four possible outcomes for the row 
player, i.e. CC is “a”, DC (where the row player plays D and the column player plays C) is “b”, CD is “c” 
and DD is “d”.  Figure 2 demonstrates which selection mechanism produces the highest average 
performance and produces the best individual performance as a function of each payoff matrix in the 
space of games. In the figure, a=0.5 and b and c vary along the x and y axis respectively, whilst changes 
in d are represented in terms of different grids.  For presentation we focus on a single value of “a”, 
however, different values been analyzed, the results are qualitatively similar and are available on request. 
Figure 2 about here 
In Figure 2 a black cell corresponds to games where group selection scored higher, grey cells when 
individual selection scored higher and white cells depict no significant difference. There were 100 
repetitions each for group and individual selection and all differences are significant with a probability of 
0.01 based on a t-test.  Figure 2A shows the results for average performance. There are four regions in 
which one selection mechanism does better than the other. The first region is the black triangular area 
approximately bounded by d<0.5, b>0.4, c<0.4, which includes games with payoffs structured like IPD 
(e.g. a=0.5, b=0.8, c=0.1 d=0.3) and Chicken (e.g. a=0.5, b=0.9, c=0.1 d=0.0). In this area the combined 
payoff for CC is the same or greater than CD/DC and DD has the lowest payoff. Consequently the 
reasoning discussed previously with regards to both of the Chicken and IPD games holds. Group selection 
allows the population to settle on an equilibrium that is beneficial to all. The payoff favors those that 
mutually cooperate and it is group selection that allows such strategies to survive in a group and be 
selected into future generations. The second region is the black triangular area approximately bounded by 
d>0.5, b<0.5, c>0.5, where the combined payoff for DD is the same or more than CD/DC and more than 
CC.  This is equivalent to the first region except that the payoff matrix is mirrored, with DD being the 
equivalent of CC. Hence the explanation is the same. 
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The third region is a black triangular slice with its base at d=0 running between b=0.5, c=0.4 and b=1.0 
c=0.6 and its point at d=0.4 b=0.9 and c=0.7. In some cases the pure CC equilibrium is optimal though in 
most cases the mixed CD is best. In both cases group selection is able to select the optimal mix of 
cooperators and defectors to maximize performance, whereas, under individual selection, this is not the 
case. Consider for example the game in which the payoffs are a=0.5, b=0.5, c=0.4, d=0.0. The best group 
payoff in this case is all cooperators but, if a defector is introduced into the population, they score as well 
as cooperators when playing cooperators (a=b) but when cooperators play them the cooperator gets the c 
score and b>c. This means the defector scores highest in the population, leading to its survival under 
individual selection, which reduces overall group performance.  
 
The fourth region is the light grey triangular slice with its base at d=0 running between b=c=0.5 and 
b=c=1.0 and its point at d=0.9 b=c=1.0.   Here the CD/DC option provides the greatest individual and 
combined payoff.  
 
If the best combination is DC or CD there is a problem of establishing and maintaining a balance of 
cooperators and defectors in the group, in order to minimize CC and DD interactions. If the lesser payoffs 
for CC and DD are approximately equal, as is the case for this small region, the ideal balance between 
cooperators and defectors is 50:50. Individual selection achieves this self balancing more effectively than 
group selection. In order to understand why, consider a population of individuals who always cooperate 
or always defect. If the number of cooperators is greater than defectors a cooperator may increase their 
payoff, along with that of the group by changing to defection. This is because the number of CC 
interactions will decrease whilst the number of DC interaction will increase5. In the optimal 50:50 mix 
any player which changes strategy will decrease both their own and the group performance. Individual 
selection is able to quickly find this mix as the under-represented strategy will score more highly and so 
be more heavily selected in the next generation; the selection mechanism will favor a 50:50 mix. Group 
                                                
5 The number of DD interactions will also increase but by less than the decrease in CC interactions. 
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selection does not have this same equalizing force it forms new strategies from all those in the best 
groups, which will allow suboptimal strategy mixes to remain in the population for  more periods. 
 
 
Figure 2B presents the results for the best performing individuals. Patterns here are less clear as there is 
considerably more variation in the best individuals in populations. Three areas, however, may still be 
observed. First, group selection produces the statistically best performing individuals in nearly half of all 
games. The results demonstrated earlier in the paper, showing that a good environment can benefit 
particular players, hold for a large proportion of the games.  Broadly, there are two regions where the best 
individuals’ performance occurs via group selection:  for d<a the region b+c>1 and for d>a, c>d.  In the 
first case the payoff for mixtures of strategies is higher than for pure CC or DD. Group selection is better 
able to maintain uneven group ratios between defectors and cooperators because, under individual 
selection, the better scoring strategy quickly drives the worse strategy out of the population. Group 
selection can produce individuals who score very highly within groups that are optimized to allow them to 
do so and which also maximize the group’s overall score. A similar effect occurs in the second case 
where again there is a benefit from some individuals being cooperators in groups in which they are 
defected against.  
 
Second, individual selection tends to produce the best individual in games where it also produced the 
highest average (as seen by the grey triangle b=c>0.5 d< 0.5), i.e. when individual and group interests are 
aligned. Third, there are other instances in which individual selection produces the best individual in a 
population though the areas in which this occurs are somewhat diffuse. The reason for this is that whilst a 
particular combination of strategies may result in a higher scoring individual, it is frequently the case that, 
as this individual spreads throughout the population, their performance is reduced. Consequently, the 
cases where individual selection produces the best individual are partially dependant on timing, i.e. at the 
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moment of measurement there is a strategy or combination of strategies that makes one individual above 
averagely successful to the detriment of others. 
 
5 Discussion 
Group selection produces the best individual and higher average performance for a wider range of games 
than individual selection. The results show that group selection dominates in games where group and 
individual payoffs are not aligned, i.e. when one player’s higher performance is at the expense of the 
group as a whole. Individual selection only does better when group and individual payoffs are aligned 
such that the combination of actions that maximize individual payoffs also maximizes group payoff. 
When interests are not aligned, group selection leads to the emergence and survival of cooperative 
ecologies of strategies in which some individuals do far better than others and the group as a whole 
benefits.  This is because group selection preserves group structure. Individual selection destroys such 
ecologies by weeding out strategies that are individually low performers but which benefit others. Under 
individual selection groups are formed of strategies which are individually high performing but which as 
a group may reduce both individual and group performance.  
 
The different regions of results in Figure 2 suggest different types of group coordination situations found 
in business.  There is only one region in which individual selection produces superior group outcomes 
(shaded grey).  This is when individual and group interests are aligned such that the combination of 
actions that maximize individual payoffs also maximizes group payoff. This situation resembles simple or 
modular coordination tasks in which individuals specialize in different subtasks that can then be 
assembled or added together, as when groups of workers take turns in digging a hole, recording results, or 
serving different customers in a market (see the experiments of Selten and Warglien, 2007 and Weber and 
Camerer, 2003). Suboptimal results can still occur due to interaction effects, if members of the group 
attempt to help (or interfere) with another’s work, if in doing so, they reduce their own performance more.  
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Group selection does better than individual selection when individual and group incentives are not 
aligned. To achieve the optimal performance some individuals must sacrifice their payoff for the good of 
the group as a whole6. A Pareto optimum results when it is possible to compensate those who sacrifice 
their own performance from the greater returns to the group as a whole. This resembles a problem in 
university departments, maximizing the number of quality publications whilst also completing teaching 
and administration.  The department can benefit if some staff cooperate by doing more administrative 
duties, so long as others publish more high quality papers than those foregone by the “cooperators.”   
 
In general it is impossible to trace group outcomes to the separate contribution of individuals. A particular 
outcome may be highly dependent on one or more members sacrificing for the good of the group and it is 
important to distinguish between free riders and group sacrifices, as they are likely to resemble each 
other.  In our simulations they are easier to distinguish because the group is modeled as a series of pair-
wise interactions. For example we can observe when group outcomes improve or decline as a result of a 
change in an individual member’s strategy.  If group outcomes decline, there is indication of free rider 
type behavior dragging down group performance, but this performance depends on the mix of other 
strategies in the group.  In real business situations such an analysis is more complex. 
 
A number of other insights emerge from our simulations. First, they draw attention to the difference 
between the strategy mix in a group, i.e. its genotype, and the behavior resulting, i.e. its phenotype. 
Cooperative behavior can result even when the strategies involved include non-cooperative behavior rules 
because these rules are never activated in the group.  Thus no one dominant strategy like TFT appears to 
emerge but the mix of strategies can still result in high performance. Rather than the genotype it is the 
phenotype – the behaviors that are actually observed which is important.   
 
 
                                                
6 This includes situations where CD/DC are the highest scoring but CC ≠DD so an equal mix is not optimal. 
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Second, linked to the above point, our results show how the processes of strategic (or genetic) drift affect 
the evolution and survival of strategies. This is possible because there is an absence of selection pressure 
on particular response rules (or genes) in strategies. This is seen in Table 2, cooperation occurs under 
group selection in responses to DCD or CDD in approximately 50% of strategies. There is no pressure for 
always cooperating or defecting in response to these histories, the value in the strategy appears to be 
random. As a result non-cooperative strategies or naïve pure cooperators may arise due to random 
mutations, which in turn create opportunities for new types of strategies to emerge that counter or take 
advantage of them.  
 
Third, the more evolutionary stable strategies emerging in the long run under group selection, have many 
of the characteristics first identified by Axelrod (1984) in relation to TFT (see Table 2 Section 4.1). In 
general, stable strategies are those that induce and sustain appropriate cooperative behavior in others, they 
are frequently: nice, provocable and forgiving. 
 
Fourth, our results show the emergence of self-correcting mechanisms bringing groups back to better 
performing ecologies of strategies. This is seen under individual selection when individual and group 
interests are aligned such that CD and DC generate the greatest payoffs for individuals and the group. 
Here any deviation from an equal mix is quickly corrected by individual selection. A similar mechanism 
is observed in Tesfatsion (1997). Whether the existence of such patterns of change can be observed in 
business interactions is an interesting issue for future research. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In recent times management research and theory has focused attention on the role and importance of 
cooperation within and between firms as an important source of improved performance and competitive 
advantage. But there is scant research concerning the means by which cooperation within and among 
groups can be developed. Our results provide a systematic basis for understanding the conditions under 
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which group based incentives systems outperform individually oriented systems in terms of the 
development of better performing groups and individuals and highlight the general conditions that bring 
about this superior performance. Group performance cannot be traced to simple additive contributions of 
each group member. Interactions matter. Performance is co-produced over time through interactions that 
in turn shape the composition and behavior of the group. When individual and group based interests are 
not aligned, individual evaluation and reward systems lead to the emergence of inferior group and 
individual performance, whereas under group based systems those involved learn to coordinate their 
actions and thereby boost overall performance. Forming and maintaining groups based on individual 
performance fails to take into account these interactions and leads to poorer performance compared to 
group based mechanisms unless individual and group interests are already closely aligned.  
 
The capability of group assessment, reward and selection mechanisms to produce more cooperative, 
better performing groups is consistent with previous empirical results which examine the effects of 
different kinds of incentive systems in business. One way of aligning individual and group interests is 
through super-ordinate goals (e.g. Hunger and Stern 1976).  These goals serve to make those involved 
reconceptualize the situation, reduce conflict and promote more cooperative behavior, which leads to 
better combined performance (e.g. Day, 1999). Katzenbach and Khan (2010) provide an example of how 
group based metrics and rewards were able to boost the performance of a failing company division.  
 
These results have relevance for managers and policy makers in assessing and improving marketing and 
business organizations, relations and networks. Our results call into question the conventional wisdom 
and common practice in which group formation and reward structures are designed in ways that in the 
main favor selection of best performing individuals. This concern has been echoed by others and 
highlighted in recent developments in relational contract theory and research on the evolution of 
cooperation (e.g. Chassang 2010, Henrich 2004, Selten and Warglien 2007, Weber and Camerer 2003). 
This overemphasis on competition in part stems from the way that the effects of structural competition 
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have been studied, i.e. situations in which two or more people vie for tangible or intangible rewards that 
are scarce.  Research has most often been conducted in laboratory settings that involve contrasts in 
performance between competitive and non-competitive individuals, rather than between competing 
individuals versus collaborating ones or between individuals and groups competing (Brown et al 1998).   
 
There are concerns regarding the impact of free riders if they are not punished (e.g. Carpenter, et al 2004). 
While group rewards carry some risk of free riders and shirking, these must not be confused with another 
type of group member, the self-sacrificer, that plays a key role in enabling other members of a group to 
function much better. Group incentive systems allow such individuals to emerge and persist in groups.  A 
focus exclusively on individual incentives is likely to damage group functioning as this over-rewards the 
most visible performers, under rewards those who support them and fails to include in metrics the costs 
and damages associated with favoring the top performers (Sutton 2007). Apparently weak individual 
performance on some metrics may hide more complex interactions in which group performance depends 
in important ways on the behavior of those that do not appear to make a direct contribution to output. 
Removing or reprimanding such individuals may damage group functions in unintended ways. Forming 
new groups from the best individual performers in previous groups could well produce dysfunctional 
and/or poorly performing groups because previous high achievers are now required to act in a new group 
context in which more adversarial interactions and counterproductive outcomes arise. 
 
For policy makers, our results reinforce the need to take inter-firm and industry relations and networks 
into account in developing trade and industry policy.  Our findings suggest the need to balance policies 
that reward individual firms with those that focus on the development of cooperative relations and 
networks that enable the group of firms to function more effectively (Porter 1990, Wilkinson et al 2000). 
 
Finally our results illustrate the potential role of simulation models to examine the behavior of complex 
systems that are beyond the reach of traditional mathematical methods (Leombruni and Matteo 2005). 
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A number of fertile areas for future research present themselves. The model can be extended by 
examining the effects of alternative representations of interaction and the evolution of strategies. 
Additionally more complex group structures may be considered potentially incorporating networks of 
interactions and considering the interdependence between these and selection mechanisms.  
 
This paper has considered group and individual selection as two alternatives, however, this does not have 
to be the case. Whilst group selection appears to outperform individual selection in many circumstances it 
may not fully differentiate in terms of rewarding self sacrificing behavior (good) as opposed to free riding 
behavior (bad). As such free riders may survive in a group over extended periods of time. One possible 
solution to this would be for firms to mix group rewards (encouraging cooperation) with individual 
incentives (encouraging effort). These two mechanisms interact in potentially complex ways so an 
interesting and very promising future research question is what is the optimal combination7. Our results 
are also useful in guiding future empirical research. Of particular importance is developing ways of 
identifying the self-sacrificers in groups, distinguishing them from free riders and studying the direct and 
indirect contributions they make to group functions in different contexts and how and why they play this 
role. Finally our results may inform the design of experiments and empirical studies to test the effect of 
incentive systems and the structure of relations in different interaction conditions.   
 
  
                                                
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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Table 1: Payoff matrices for three sample games (row player payoff, column player payoff)  
 
 C D   C D   C D 
C 4, 4 1, 5  C 4, 4 1, 7  C 4, 4 1, 10 
D 5, 1 2, 2  D 7, 1 0, 0  D 10, 1 0, 0 
a: Prisoners Dilemma Game    b: Weak Chicken Game          c: Strong Chicken Game 
 
 
 
Table 2: Probability of a cooperating for strategies with memory length 3 in the final generation  
 
Position Hist-3 Hist-2 Hist-1 DDD DDC DCD DCC CDD CDC CCD CCC 
Group 61.9% 83.3% 88.7% 55.5% 58.0% 48.8% 84.1% 49.8% 55.6% 54.1% 98.9% 
Individual 54.1% 56.1% 86.0% 30.8% 26.4% 53.4% 67.0% 48.0% 71.9% 62.3% 77.6% 
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Figure 1: Scores of the best, worst and average individuals for the Prisoners Dilemma (top),  Weak 
Chicken (middle) and Strong Chicken Game (bottom) under group (left) and individual selection (right). 
 
  Group Selection         Individual Selection 
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Figure 2: Comparison of group and individual selection mechanisms in terms of the final generation 
across a range of games. (payoff matrix: CC= a, DC=b, CD=c and DD= d. Simulations results with a=0.5, 
b on the x-axis, c on the y-axis, 100 repetitions each, p < 0.001 t-test). Top figure, mean performance of 
players. Bottom figure, performance of highest scoring players. 
 
 
